Discovered: December 30, 2008
Updated: March 24, 2009 12:05:35 PM
Also Known As: Worm:W32/Downadup.AL [F-Secure], Win32/Conficker.B [Computer Associates], W32/Confick-D [Sophos], WORM_DOWNAD.AD [Trend], Net-Worm.Win32.Kido.ih [Kaspersky], Conficker.D [Panda Software]
Type: Worm
Systems Affected: Windows 2000, Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows Me, Windows NT, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows XP
CVE References: CVE-2008-4250
Once executed, the worm checks for the presence of the following registry entries and if not present will create them:- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\"dl" = "0"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\"dl" = "0"
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\"ds" = "0"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\"ds" = "0"
It then copies itself as one or more of the following files:
- %ProgramFiles%\Internet Explorer\[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll
- %ProgramFiles%\Movie Maker\[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll
- %System%\[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll
- %Temp%\[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll
- C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data \[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll
It creates a new service with the following characteristics:
Service Name: [PATH TO WORM]
Display Name: [WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]
Startup Type: Automatic
Next, it registers as a service by creating the following registry entries:
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\Parameters\"ServiceDll" = "[PATH TO WORM]"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"ImagePath" = %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"Type" = "4"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"Start" = "4"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"ErrorControl" = "4"
Note: [WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME] represents a two word combination taken from a list of the following words:
- Boot
- Center
- Config
- Driver
- Helper
- Image
- Installer
- Manager
- Microsoft
- Monitor
- Network
- Security
- Server
- Shell
- Support
- System
- Task
- Time
- Universal
- Update
- Windows
The worm creates the following registry entry, so that it runs every time Windows starts:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\"[RANDOM NAME]" = "rundll32.exe "[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll", ydmmgvos"
Next, the worm deletes any System Restore points created by the user.
The worm then runs a command that speeds up network access on the compromised computer by disabling the Windows Vista TCP/IP auto-tuning to spread more rapidly.
The worm also modifies the following registry entry so that the worm spreads more rapidly across a network:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\"TcpNumConnections" = "00FFFFFE"
Next the worm stops both of the following Windows services:
- Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS)
- Windows Automatic Update Service (wuauserv)
The worm then modifies the following file in order to disable the half-open connections limit introduced with Windows XP SP2:
%System%\drivers\tcpip.sys
It also attempts to hide itself on the system by modifying the following registry value:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\Advanced\Folder\Hidden\SHOWALL\"CheckedValue" = "0"
Next, the worm enumerates available ADMIN$ network shares. It then enumerates the users for those shares and attempts to establish a connection as an existing user, with one of the following passwords:
- 000
- 0000
- 00000
- 0000000
- 00000000
- 0987654321
- 111
- 1111
- 11111
- 111111
- 1111111
- 11111111
- 123
- 123123
- 12321
- 123321
- 1234
- 12345
- 123456
- 1234567
- 12345678
- 123456789
- 1234567890
- 1234abcd
- 1234qwer
- 123abc
- 123asd
- 123qwe
- 1q2w3e
- 222
- 2222
- 22222
- 222222
- 2222222
- 22222222
- 321
- 333
- 3333
- 33333
- 333333
- 3333333
- 33333333
- 4321
- 444
- 4444
- 44444
- 444444
- 4444444
- 44444444
- 54321
- 555
- 5555
- 55555
- 555555
- 5555555
- 55555555
- 654321
- 666
- 6666
- 66666
- 666666
- 6666666
- 66666666
- 7654321
- 777
- 7777
- 77777
- 777777
- 7777777
- 77777777
- 87654321
- 888
- 8888
- 88888
- 888888
- 8888888
- 88888888
- 987654321
- 999
- 9999
- 99999
- 999999
- 9999999
- 99999999
- a1b2c3
- aaa
- aaaa
- aaaaa
- abc123
- academia
- access
- account
- Admin
- admin
- admin1
- admin12
- admin123
- adminadmin
- administrator
- anything
- asddsa
- asdfgh
- asdsa
- asdzxc
- backup
- boss123
- business
- campus
- changeme
- cluster
- codename
- codeword
- coffee
- computer
- controller
- cookie
- customer
- database
- default
- desktop
- domain
- example
- exchange
- explorer
- file
- files
- foo
- foobar
- foofoo
- forever
- freedom
- fuck
- games
- home
- home123
- ihavenopass
- Internet
- internet
- intranet
- job
- killer
- letitbe
- letmein
- login
- Login
- lotus
- love123
- manager
- market
- money
- monitor
- mypass
- mypassword
- mypc123
- nimda
- nobody
- nopass
- nopassword
- nothing
- office
- oracle
- owner
- pass
- pass1
- pass12
- pass123
- passwd
- password
- Password
- password1
- password12
- password123
- private
- public
- pw123
- q1w2e3
- qazwsx
- qazwsxedc
- qqq
- qqqq
- qqqqq
- qwe123
- qweasd
- qweasdzxc
- qweewq
- qwerty
- qwewq
- root
- root123
- rootroot
- sample
- secret
- secure
- security
- server
- shadow
- share
- sql
- student
- super
- superuser
- supervisor
- system
- temp
- temp123
- temporary
- temptemp
- test
- test123
- testtest
- unknown
- web
- windows
- work
- work123
- xxx
- xxxx
- xxxxx
- zxccxz
- zxcvb
- zxcvbn
- zxcxz
- zzz
- zzzz
- zzzzz
Note: Depending on the account lockout settings, multiple authentication attempts by the worm may result in those accounts becoming locked out.
If successful, the worm copies itself to the share as the following file:
[SHARE NAME]\ADMIN$\System32\[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll
It then creates a scheduled job on the remote server to run daily consisting of the following command:
"rundll32.exe [RANDOM FILE NAME].dll, [RANDOM PARAMETER STRING]"
Next, the worm connects to the following URLs to obtain the IP address of the compromised computer:
- [http://]www.getmyip.org
- [http://]www.whatsmyipaddress.com
- [http://]getmyip.co.uk
- [http://]checkip.dyndns.org
The worm creates a firewall rule on the local network gateway device that allows remote attackers to connect to and download from the compromised computer's external IP address through a random port.
The worm then creates an HTTP server on the compromised computer on a random port in the following format:
http://[COMPROMISED COMPUTER EXTERNAL IP ADDRESS]:[RANDOM PORT]
It then sends this URL to remote computers.
The worm then attempts to spread by exploiting the following vulnerability so that remote computers will connect to the above named URL and download the worm:
Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 31874)
The worm then attempts to copy itself to any accessible mapped drive as the following file:
%DriveLetter%\RECYCLER\S-%d-%d-%d-%d%d%d-%d%d%d-%d%d%d-%d\[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll
The worm also attempts to create the following file on any accessible mapped drive so that it executes whenever the drive is accessed:
%DriveLetter%\autorun.inf
It also monitors the compromised computer for any additional new drives and then attempts to infect any newly added drives in the same way.
The worm hooks a number of Windows API calls in order to spread and to make removal more difficult.
The worm also hooks the NetpwPathCanonicalize API and when it is called, it checks the length of PathName in order to avoid exploiting the vulnerability further. If the PathName contains a signature the worm originally has, the PathName may contain an encrypted URL as well from which the worm may download a file and execute it.
The worm patches the following API's in memory:
- DNS_Query_A
- DNS_Query_UTF8
- DNS_Query_W
- Query_Main
- sendto
The worm monitors DNS requests to domains containing any of the following strings and blocks access to these domains so that it appears that the network request timed out:
- ahnlab
- arcabit
- avast
- avg.
- avira
- avp.
- bit9.
- ca.
- castlecops
- centralcommand
- cert.
- clamav
- comodo
- computerassociates
- cpsecure
- defender
- drweb
- emsisoft
- esafe
- eset
- etrust
- ewido
- f-prot
- f-secure
- fortinet
- gdata
- grisoft
- hacksoft
- hauri
- ikarus
- jotti
- k7computing
- kaspersky
- malware
- mcafee
- microsoft
- nai.
- networkassociates
- nod32
- norman
- norton
- panda
- pctools
- prevx
- quickheal
- rising
- rootkit
- sans.
- securecomputing
- sophos
- spamhaus
- spyware
- sunbelt
- symantec
- threatexpert
- trendmicro
- vet.
- virus
- wilderssecurity
- windowsupdate
It contacts one of the following sites to get the current date:
- baidu.com
- google.com
- yahoo.com
- msn.com
- ask.com
- w3.org
- aol.com
- cnn.com
- ebay.com
- msn.com
- myspace.com
It then checks to see whether the date on the compromised computer is on or after January 1, 2009.
The worm will then generate a list of domain names based upon this date in the following format:
[GENERATED DOMAIN NAME].[TOP LEVEL DOMAIN]
Note: [TOP LEVEL DOMAIN] represents the following top level domains:
- .biz
- .info
- .org
- .net
- .com
- .ws
- .cn
- .cc
Note: [GENERATED DOMAIN NAME] represents the domain names created by the worm such as the following example list of domain names generated for January 1, 2009:
- aaidhe.net
- aamkn.cn
- abivbwbea.info
- aiiflkgcw.cc
- alfglesj.info
- amcfussyags.net
- amzohx.ws
- apaix.ws
- argvss.info
- arolseqnu.ws
- asoidakm.cn
- atnsoiuf.cc
- avweqdcr.cn
- axaxmhzndcq.cc
- barhkuuu.com
- bbuftxpskw.cc
- bdykhlnhak.cc
- bdzpfiu.biz
- bijkyilaugs.cn
- bjpmhuk.ws
- bmmjbsjidmt.com
- bzagbiwes.cc
- carse.cn
- cauksxf.biz
- cfhlglxofyz.biz
- cinsns.cc
- ciynbjwm.com
- cljivsb.biz
- cpeadyepcis.biz
- cqnxku.ws
- ctmchiae.ws
- cxjsy.net
- czkdu.net
- dbffky.cn
- dgbdjsb.com
- drpifjfxlyl.ws
- dtosuhc.org
- duahpzq.org
- dwrtwgsm.cn
- dyjomzyz.com
- earuldx.cn
- egqoab.net
- egxbsppn.cn
- ehkvku.cn
- elivvks.net
- emxmg.info
- eobvidij.org
- erwojl.org
- evqvmwgw.cn
- ewioygq.biz
- exxkvcz.cc
- ffaqk.info
- fhlwov.net
- fitjg.net
- fkhbumne.info
- fknacmvowib.cn
- fmdsqasqm.net
- fmgcjv.cn
- fpljpuqp.info
- fsrljjeemkr.info
- fthil.cc
- ftphtsfuv.net
- gbgklrka.cc
- gbmkghqcqy.net
- gbxyu.ws
- gezjwr.biz
- gjbwolesl.info
- glkzckadwu.biz
- gmvhjp.ws
- gsvrglz.cc
- gutvjbektzq.com
- gwtqx.cn
- hbyzvpeadkb.net
- hewdw.ws
- hjcxnhtroh.cn
- hltowx.com
- hqjazhyd.com
- hrmirvid.com
- hudphigb.org
- hvagbqmtxp.info
- idvgqlr.ws
- ihnvoeprql.biz
- iidqkzselpr.com
- ijthszjlb.com
- iklzskqoz.cn
- iqgnqt.org
- iqrzamxo.ws
- isjjlnv.org
- iudqzypn.cn
- iyfcmcaj.cn
- jayrocykoj.ws
- jffhkvhweds.cn
- jfxcvnnawk.org
- jgrftgunh.org
- jguxjs.net
- jhanljqti.cc
- jhvlfdoiyn.biz
- jjhajbfcdmk.net
- jkisptknsov.biz
- jknxcxyg.net
- jlouqrgb.org
- jpppffeywn.cc
- jradvwa.biz
- juqsiucfrmi.net
- jvnzbsyhv.org
- jxnyyjyo.net
- kaonwzkc.info
- kdcqtamjhdx.ws
- kgeoaxznfms.biz
- kihbccvqrz.net
- kimonrvh.org
- kjsxwpq.ws
- kkrxwcjusgu.cn
- knqwdcgow.ws
- koaqe.cc
- kodzhq.org
- kqjvmbst.net
- kufvkkdtpf.net
- kxujboszjnz.ws
- lagcrxz.cc
- lawwb.com
- lbdfwrbz.net
- ljizrzxu.cc
- lmswntmc.biz
- lotvecu.com
- lplsebah.cn
- lxhmwparzc.ws
- lyamwnhh.info
- mciuomjrsmn.cn
- mdntwxhj.cn
- meqyeyggu.cc
- mfigu.cn
- mimdezm.biz
- mkdsine.cn
- mmtdsgwfa.net
- mouvmlhz.cc
- mozsj.biz
- mpqzwlsx.ws
- msvhmlcmkmh.biz
- mtruba.ws
- myrmifyuqo.biz
- naucgxjtu.ws
- ncwjlti.cn
- nertthl.net
- nnxqqmdl.info
- nuxtzd.cn
- nxvmztmryie.ws
- nybxvgb.net
- nzsrgzmhay.net
- oadscrk.org
- oezepyh.info
- ojrswlg.net
- olgjkxih.org
- omqxqptc.ws
- ooudifyw.cn
- opkawiqb.cn
- oqsfz.ws
- orvfkx.cc
- otoajxfn.net
- oxeeuikd.net
- oyezli.com
- pfath.info
- plsexbnytn.com
- poplie.cc
- psbdfflh.cn
- qfmbqxom.ws
- qjvtczqu.com
- qpcizvlvio.biz
- qslhoks.cn
- qtcnfvf.biz
- qtsnk.cn
- qzktamrsgu.cn
- rbhixtifxk.cc
- rccoq.net
- rgievita.ws
- rlrbqpxv.org
- rozhtnmoudg.cc
- rpsctacalyd.cn
- rrmkv.com
- rtpuqxp.net
- rtztoupc.net
- satmxnz.ws
- sbtalilx.com
- sdjnaeoh.cc
- sirkqq.org
- sjkkfjcx.biz
- sjkxyjqsx.net
- stmsoxiguz.net
- tdeghkjm.biz
- tkhnvhmh.biz
- tmdoxfcc.org
- torhobdfzit.cc
- trdfcxclp.org
- tscmbj.net
- tuwcuuuj.com
- txeixqeh.biz
- uazwqaxlpq.info
- ubxxtnzdbij.com
- ucnfehj.org
- uekmqqedtfm.com
- uhtmou.ws
- uhveiguagm.biz
- uoieg.ws
- uttcx.net
- uyhgoiwswn.cc
- uyvtuutxm.cn
- vfxifizf.info
- vupnwmw.biz
- vzqpqlpk.ws
- waeqoxlrprp.org
- wdrvyudhg.cc
- wediscbpi.org
- whgtdhqg.net
- wkstxvzr.org
- wmrgzac.info
- wnwqphzao.info
- wsajx.com
- wskzbakqfvk.org
- wtngipaynh.info
- wumvjpbbmse.cc
- wuzunxevor.info
- wwftlwlvm.org
- xcncp.info
- xeeuat.com
- xhazhbir.biz
- xjnyfwt.org
- xlrqvoqmsxz.info
- xqgbn.cn
- xwrrxwmo.cc
- xxabrkhb.cc
- xxmgkcw.cc
- xxxxgvtaa.com
- xzoycphicpk.com
- ybbfrznr.info
- ycceqdmm.cc
- ydxnochqn.org
- ygmwharv.info
- ylnytttckyc.com
- yuvudlsdop.cc
- ywhaunsyez.cc
- ywxdggnaaad.org
- zindtsqq.ws
- zkywmqx.com
- zoosmv.info
- zqekqyq.cn
- zqked.org
- zsatn.ws
- ztgsd.info
- ztioydng.com
- zzczpujz.biz
The worm then contacts the following remote location based on the domain names generated:
http://[GENERATED DOMAIN NAME].[TOP LEVEL DOMAIN]/search?q=%d
It will then download an updated copy of itself from the above remote location.
The worm may also receive and execute files through a peer-to-peer mechanism by communicating with other compromised computers. These files would need to be seeded into the network of worms by the malware author.
Recommendations
Symantec Security Response encourages all users and administrators to adhere to the following basic security "best practices":
- Use a firewall to block all incoming connections from the Internet to services that should not be publicly available. By default, you should deny all incoming connections and only allow services you explicitly want to offer to the outside world.
- Enforce a password policy. Complex passwords make it difficult to crack password files on compromised computers. This helps to prevent or limit damage when a computer is compromised.
- Ensure that programs and users of the computer use the lowest level of privileges necessary to complete a task. When prompted for a root or UAC password, ensure that the program asking for administration-level access is a legitimate application.
- Disable AutoPlay to prevent the automatic launching of executable files on network and removable drives, and disconnect the drives when not required. If write access is not required, enable read-only mode if the option is available.
- Turn off file sharing if not needed. If file sharing is required, use ACLs and password protection to limit access. Disable anonymous access to shared folders. Grant access only to user accounts with strong passwords to folders that must be shared.
- Turn off and remove unnecessary services. By default, many operating systems install auxiliary services that are not critical. These services are avenues of attack. If they are removed, threats have less avenues of attack.
- If a threat exploits one or more network services, disable, or block access to, those services until a patch is applied.
- Always keep your patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
- Configure your email server to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used to spread threats, such as .vbs, .bat, .exe, .pif and .scr files.
- Isolate compromised computers quickly to prevent threats from spreading further. Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
- Train employees not to open attachments unless they are expecting them. Also, do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses. Simply visiting a compromised Web site can cause infection if certain browser vulnerabilities are not patched.
- If Bluetooth is not required for mobile devices, it should be turned off. If you require its use, ensure that the device's visibility is set to "Hidden" so that it cannot be scanned by other Bluetooth devices. If device pairing must be used, ensure that all devices are set to "Unauthorized", requiring authorization for each connection request. Do not accept applications that are unsigned or sent from unknown sources.
Symantec Security Response has developed a removal tool to clean the infections of W32.Downadup. Use this removal tool first, as it is the easiest way to remove this threat.
Manual Removal:
The following instructions pertain to all current and recent Symantec antivirus products, including the Symantec AntiVirus and Norton AntiVirus product lines.
- Disable System Restore (Windows Me/XP).
- Update the virus definitions.
- Find and stop the service.
- Find and remove unrecognised scheduled tasks, if necessary.
- Run a full system scan.
- Delete any values added to the registry.
For specific details on each of these steps, read the following instructions.
1. To disable System Restore (Windows Me/XP)
If you are running Windows Me or Windows XP, we recommend that you temporarily turn off System Restore. Windows Me/XP uses this feature, which is enabled by default, to restore the files on your computer in case they become damaged. If a virus, worm, or Trojan infects a computer, System Restore may back up the virus, worm, or Trojan on the computer.
Windows prevents outside programs, including antivirus programs, from modifying System Restore. Therefore, antivirus programs or tools cannot remove threats in the System Restore folder. As a result, System Restore has the potential of restoring an infected file on your computer, even after you have cleaned the infected files from all the other locations.
Also, a virus scan may detect a threat in the System Restore folder even though you have removed the threat.
For instructions on how to turn off System Restore, read your Windows documentation, or one of the following articles:
- How to disable or enable Windows Me System Restore
- How to turn off or turn on Windows XP System Restore
Note: When you are completely finished with the removal procedure and are satisfied that the threat has been removed, reenable System Restore by following the instructions in the aforementioned documents.
For additional information, and an alternative to disabling Windows Me System Restore, see the Microsoft Knowledge Base article: Antivirus Tools Cannot Clean Infected Files in the _Restore Folder (Article ID: Q263455).
2. To update the virus definitions
Symantec Security Response fully tests all the virus definitions for quality assurance before they are posted to our servers. There are two ways to obtain the most recent virus definitions:
- Running LiveUpdate, which is the easiest way to obtain virus definitions.
If you use Norton AntiVirus 2006, Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition 10.0, or newer products, LiveUpdate definitions are updated daily. These products include newer technology.
If you use Norton AntiVirus 2005, Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition 9.0, or earlier products, LiveUpdate definitions are updated weekly. The exception is major outbreaks, when definitions are updated more often. - Downloading the definitions using the Intelligent Updater: The Intelligent Updater virus definitions are posted daily. You should download the definitions from the Symantec Security Response Web site and manually install them.
The latest Intelligent Updater virus definitions can be obtained here: Intelligent Updater virus definitions. For detailed instructions read the document: How to update virus definition files using the Intelligent Updater.
3. To find and stop the service
- Click Start > Run.
- Type services.msc, and then click OK.
- Locate and select the service that was detected.
Note: The service created by the threat is called [PATH TO WORM]. - Click Action > Properties.
- Click Stop.
- Change Startup Type to Manual.
- Click OK and close the Services window.
- Restart the computer.
- Click Start > Program Files.
- Click > Accessories.
- Click > System Tools.
- Click > Scheduled Tasks.
- Locate and select any unrecognised scheduled tasks.
- Click Delete this Item
- Click Yes and close the Scheduled Tasks window.
- Restart the computer.
- Start your Symantec antivirus program and make sure that it is configured to scan all the files.
For Norton AntiVirus consumer products: Read the document: How to configure Norton AntiVirus to scan all files.
For Symantec AntiVirus Enterprise products: Read the document: How to verify that a Symantec Corporate antivirus product is set to scan all files. - Run a full system scan.
- If any files are detected, follow the instructions displayed by your antivirus program.
After the files are deleted, restart the computer in Normal mode and proceed with the next section.
Warning messages may be displayed when the computer is restarted, since the threat may not be fully removed at this point. You can ignore these messages and click OK. These messages will not appear when the computer is restarted after the removal instructions have been fully completed. The messages displayed may be similar to the following:
Title: [FILE PATH]
Message body: Windows cannot find [FILE NAME]. Make sure you typed the name correctly, and then try again. To search for a file, click the Start button, and then click Search.
6. To delete the value from the registry
Important: Symantec strongly recommends that you back up the registry before making any changes to it. Incorrect changes to the registry can result in permanent data loss or corrupted files. Modify the specified subkeys only. For instructions refer to the document: How to make a backup of the Windows registry.
- Click Start > Run.
- Type regedit
- Click OK.
Note: If the registry editor fails to open the threat may have modified the registry to prevent access to the registry editor. Security Response has developed a tool to resolve this problem. Download and run this tool, and then continue with the removal. - Navigate to and delete the following registry entries:
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\"[RANDOM NAME]" = "rundll32.exe "[RANDOM FILE NAME].dll", ydmmgvos"
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\"dl" = "0"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\"dl" = "0"
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\"ds" = "0"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\"ds" = "0"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"DisplayName" = "[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"Type" = "4"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"Start" = "4"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"ErrorControl" = "4"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\"ImagePath" = "%SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[WORM GENERATED SERVICE NAME]\Parameters\"ServiceDll" = "[PATH TO WORM]"
- Restore the following registry entries to their previous values, if required:
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\"TcpNumConnections" = "00FFFFFE"
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\Advanced\Folder\Hidden\SHOWALL\"CheckedValue" = "0"
- Exit the Registry Editor.
Note: If the risk creates or modifies registry subkeys or entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER, it is possible that it created them for every user on the compromised computer. To ensure that all registry subkeys or entries are removed or restored, log on using each user account and check for any HKEY_CURRENT_USER items listed above.
